Charles E. Clark by Douglas, William O.
CHARLES E. CLARK
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
NEARLY forty years of friendship makes it impossible for me to write objec-
tively about Charles E. Clark. Our association goes back to the 1920's when
he was ploughing the fields of procedure at Yale-a work of scholarship that
was to flower years later in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The years
at Yale with him while he was first a professor and later Dean were rich in a
warm, personal relationship. We produced a case book on Partnership together.
We were associated with the Wickersham Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement and somewhere in its dusty files are some products of our
work. We were together on many forums and proselytized many common
causes.
His appointment to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 1939,
by Franklin D. Roosevelt, followed a long tradition. Dean Thomas W. Swan
had also come to that court from the Yale Deanship and prior to him Dean
Henry Wade Rogers.
As John P. Frank has stated, Judge Clark "needs more than judicial duties
to keep busy.... He writes regularly for legal publications, recently revised
several of his books, and during summers, of late, has taught law."' He has,
indeed, long had great reserves of energy that have made him creative beyond
most of us.
Perhaps it is the law professor still in him that makes him conscious of the
duty of judges to be good housekeepers and to keep their cupboards, where
rule, precedent and doctrine are kept, tidy and neat.
2
He has been a stout defender of the jury system, knowing that judges de-
velop callouses or prejudice that often keep them from resolving fact questions
objectively and fairly. He answers every assault on the jury system,
s regarding
it as embodying a right, to use Madison's words, "resulting from a social com-
pact, which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure
the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature."
4
When feelings ran high on the Wagner Act and trade unionists were sus-
pect, Charles E. Clark stood fast behind the congressional policy concerning
collective bargaining and helped bring a measure of justice coupled with law
to the tumultuous labor-management field.5
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It would take a tome to evaluate and appraise his judicial work. Two massive
peaks make his career outstanding.
In the field of civil rights he has 'been bold and courageous, often standing
apart from the crowd. During the days of the "witch hunt" in the 1940's, he
wrote a classic dissent in United States v. Josephson,6 on the power of legis-
lative committees to investigate men's ideas and beliefs. A broad, undefined
authority to probe anything "unAmerican" and make criminal anyone who
refused to cooperate was in his view unconstitutional:
After all, "subversive" means "tending to subvert" which, in turn,
means "to pervert or corrupt (one) by undermining his morals, allegiance,
or faith; to alienate ... ." But advocacy of a change in political thought
is certainly an attempt to undermine the faith of the present. All of this
points to and underlines the real vice of so vague and ambiguous an au-
thority when so determinedly marshalled against minority views. It invites
and justifies an attempt to enforce conformity of political thinking, to
penalize the new and the original, to label as subversive or un-American
the attempt to devise new approaches for the public welfare, in short, to
damn that very kind of initiative in experimentation which has made our
democracy grow and flourish .... 7
It is, of course, true that Congress, not the courts, has the responsibility
of determining the need and extent of legislation within constitutional
limits. And since it may forbid propaganda of dangerous proportions when
it chooses, it obviously may investigate the need of such prohibition. But
when it attacks not merely dangerous propaganda, but in effect all argu-
mentation departing from the then norm, there is no justification for the
wide reaches of its claim of authority.8
His.ideas were not heeded and we were witnesses to a frightening inquisition.
It was in this same spirit that he called for judicial restraint when dealing
with unpopular minorities. Mobs can march and chant but the courtroom must
reflect no passion except that for justice. In a dissent to be remembered long
after he is gone, he protested summary punishment for contempt of the law-
yers in the communist trials.9
. .. the law must both appear and be inexorable rather than vindictive;
and the constitutional course of due process requires that conviction and
sentence come only after orderly hearing upon announced charges and full
opportunity to the accused to defend themselves. True, there is a single
exception resting on necessity and commoi sense. If there are breaches of
courtroom behavior to the point of preventing the proper functioning of
the court, the judge has the authority to take the necessary steps to secure
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order. But if the difficulty does not require so drastic steps-has indeed
been surmounted without resort to them-and the question is one only of
punishment, as retribution and example, then the ordinary requirements
of due process must be satisfied. For -the person accused of a criminal
contempt, like any other accused, is entitled to the opportunity to excul-
pate himself, so far as his evidence permits, before being sentenced to
imprisonment. Hence the immediate issue in this case is not at all as be-
tween appropriate punishment and complete immunity from penalty; it
is as to the maner in which the question of guilt or punishment can be
legally and appropriately tried, or more broadly the course which will best
preserve at once the rights of the accused and the dignity of the law in
accordance with the highest standards of American justice....
I know of no wiser course than to proceed deliberately according to the
wisdom of the law as developed in other and perhaps less emotional times,
and to approach judgment and punishment deliberately, but by that course
the more surely and justly.
He honored the traditions of Due Process when he made this plea; and in
retrospect many who at the time thought him wrong regret the blight on our
record that those summary convictions wrought.
With the arrival of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,'0 federal courts have had to
resolve more and more state law .questions. There has emerged the "abstention"
doctrine, described in origin "as a discretionary device used to forestall decision
of a federal constitutional question in cases involving complicated questions of
state administrative and regulatory policy."" Judge Clark has been critical of
its development and broadening use.
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... it appears to be employed even in cases where no constitutional issues
are present and where no particularly delicate matters of state policy are
at stake. It has been used in cases where the court has jurisdiction on
diversity grounds, as well as when jurisdiction is based solely on a federal
question. Because a majority of the Supreme Court has continued to in-
sist on this principle, it has come to seem more mandatory than discre-
tionary. As a result of this doctrine, individual litigants have been shuffled
back and forth between state and federal courts, and cases have been
dragged out over eight and ten-year periods.
Such criticism marks Judge Clark's attitude on the role of the judiciary. Some
want the appellate courts to do as little as possible, to be highly selective in
the cases they take for decision, to avoid so long as possible controversial is-
sues. Thus, it is thought, the majority of the courts-particularly the United
States Supreme Court-will be maintained against the hue and cry of critics.
Judge Clark protests against that retiring role for the federal and state judi-
ciary. In this highly complex society where government becomes more and
more powerful, political processes are less and less effective in protecting
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minorities. As we become more dependent on each other, as we become more
securely locked into a closed society with no frontier as an escape, we become
more helpless. The passivity and retreat of the courts make many pressing
problems fester and become worse-as evidenced by the long years in which
the judiciary refused to interfere in the basic racial problems of the nation.
Where -there is no remedy, there is no right; and those plowed under by the
status quo remain helpless. judge Clark has put the idea in enduring words:
... if a court tries to avoid an issue by deciding in the negative or for the
defendant, why that is a decision, a negative precedent, of often far-reach-
ing import. There is no way that decision can be avoided; there is only a
kind of pressure-even presumption-to choose what seems the side clos-
est to precedent and past action. And that means a conservative vote for
inaction and the status quo. It is a sad, but little noticed, fact that neutral
principles eventually push to re-enforce the dead hand of the law and the
rule of the past.'8
Judge Clark stands high above the ranks. He has brought new stature to the
judiciary and added dignity to the law by reading it and writing it so that it
brings justice to our ideological and racial ghettoes, as well as to the market
place.
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